If you've read my photography business articles on the Internet for any length of time—that could be for up to 25 years now—you'll know that one thing I keep coming back to with the camera makers is product line management, and how important it is. In my other article today I write about one such problem that Nikon has: only a middle. But it's starting to become clear that there was another transition that Nikon missed.
First, why is product line management so important? Well, it's essentially the definition of what business you're in. Scattered products don't show critical understanding of both your business and customer. When you develop via scattershot, you're essentially just a gambler putting down bets on Come, Field, and bunch of soft numbers and hard way combos. Something will pay off.
When you master product line management, you have a targeted business that understands its customers and their needs, and fulfills them. The customers stay loyal and keep buying because of that.
Sony was the first to get things right: one mount for all consumer (APS-C), prosumer/pro (full frame), and pro video cameras. Why is it critical to put everything in the same mount? Because we pro photographers don't see a single request for bid these days that doesn't include both still and video requirements, we want to use the best gear for the job, and we don't want to have to buy overlapping gear. Mixing and matching systems used to be the only way we could shoot both stills and video. Doing that also brings up issues like trying to match still output with the video output (color, contrast, etc.). Today, however, if you're using Sony gear, you don't have those issues, as the one-mount-for-everything product line management decision makes it easy to keep us from doing too much lens and accessory duplication, and allows us to easily match the look of our stills against our video. Again, understanding and serving a customer well makes them loyal.
Canon has now tipped their hand that they're going the same direction. The recent C70 introduction tells us that future Canon Cinema cameras are now going to all join the RF mount, and rumors of APS-C RF cameras and lenses continue to percolate. It's likely that Canon will be all RF within the next full set of product launch cycles.
The latest rumor is that Panasonic has "picked a lane," and that lane is L-mount for the pro video side, with S5-like full frame L-mount bodies on the still side.
This would be three powerhouse—still and video—producers all doing the same thing and standardizing on a lens mount, making things easier for their top customers. Exactly the customers that consumers and enthusiasts look to for advice.
So what's Nikon's mistake? After all, it looks like Z-mount is their future for both APS-C (DX) and full frame (FX). Simple: Nikon never expanded their product line to video. If pros really do influence what choices the rest of the market makes, Canon, Panasonic, and Sony will soon have a story that Nikon can't match. The danger is that this relegates Nikon to a "stills only" niche, essentially the equivalent of being a one-trick pony. There's forced contraction (aging market, smartphone erosion, and pandemic), and there's unforced contraction (self injury). No video line is an unforced contraction on Nikon's part. (Another way of looking at it would be an unforced restriction of potential growth.)
That's not to say that the Z6, for example, isn't a stellar video camera. It is, but it's in the wrong form factor for a lot of work, and Nikon hasn't shown an iota of interest in making video-specific lenses. Moreover, every time Nikon has made a step forward—first with DSLR video in the D90, later with full frame raw with the Z6/Atomos combo—the other competitors almost immediately pass Nikon by, because Nikon doesn't prioritize keeping any video lead they might manage to grab.
Nikon's problem is that they got "hooked on volume." Volume that was absolutely destined to be a race to the bottom. Coolpix was one example. Even Nikon 1 was an example, though it didn't work economically the way Nikon wanted it to. KeyMission was, from the very moment Nikon announced it, an obvious miss, as it wasn't aimed at building on the solid prosumer/pro base they already had, but was yet another swing at pure volume. "Hey, if GoPro is the fastest growing camera company for a brief period, maybe we should do that, right fellas?"
What Nikon should have done is use what was its excellent reputation in Hollywood (for lenses) to expand into high-end pro video. True, that wasn't (and still isn't) a high volume market, but it's one that will pay high prices for excellent gear, something that Nikon Imaging seems to keep forgetting was the core to their long-term success.
Sadly, I don't think that Nikon is going to realize their mistake, let alone fix it. I suppose they could hook up with an orphan pro video maker, such as JVC, but short of acquisition, that wouldn't produce much for Nikon other than another outlet for their Z lenses (and they'd still have to make some video ones).
Nikon will be (several) Harvard Business School Case Studies some day. The risk here—and what would trigger one of those case studies—is that Nikon will have lost market share to competitors not just once, not just twice, but three times, all because of poor product line management decisions. The product line management problem, whatever causes it, is systemic at Nikon.
